

# 2019 International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report to the G20



**OECD**

BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES



**IOM**

UN MIGRATION



**UNHCR**

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés

# Contents

- Executive summary ..... 3
- Introduction..... 4
  - 1. Recent trends in migration and refugee movements in G20 countries..... 4
    - a. Migration flows in 2017 and 2018..... 4
    - b. Enrolment of international students in G20 countries ..... 7
    - c. Refugee stocks, asylum applications, resettlement and complementary pathways for those in need of international protection..... 8
  - 2. Immigrant skills and labour market integration..... 13
    - a. Recent evidence on migrant labour market integration in selected G20 countries ..... 13
    - b. Evidence on refugee labour market integration ..... 15
  - 3. Recent trends in emigration and remittances..... 19
    - a. A profile of diaspora in G20 countries by skill levels and countries of birth..... 19
    - b. Emigration rates to G20 countries by educational attainment for countries of origin of immigrants..... 20
    - Recent trends in remittances, diaspora engagement and development impact ..... 22
    - c. Diaspora engagement ..... 24
  - 4. Demographic changes, digitalisation, migration and forced displacement..... 25
    - a. Recent and forthcoming demographic trends: possible implications for migration ..... 25
    - b. Digitalisation, new forms of work and implications for migration and forced displacement 28
- Conclusion ..... 32
- References..... 33

## Executive summary

### **Key migration, forced displacement and integration trends**

- More than 10 million people migrate permanently or temporarily to G20 countries in 2018.
- Preliminary data indicate a small increase in overall migration flows to G20 countries in 2018, despite a small decline notably in Australia, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
- In 2016, over 4 million international students were enrolled in tertiary education in the G20. More than half of international students in the G20 come from another G20 country.
- At mid-2018, the global refugee population stood at 25.7 million, including 5.5 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate. G20 countries hosted 7.3 million refugees, representing about 36 per cent of all refugees under UNHCR's mandate. About half of them were in Turkey. To address the challenges associated with forced displacement and humanitarian crises the question of solidarity and responsibility sharing remains at the top of the international agenda.
- During the first half of 2018, there were an estimated 879 600 claims for asylum lodged globally, including 646 400 in G20 countries.
- On average, in the G20 area, foreign-born individuals are more likely to be employed than their native-born peers (66% vs. 62%). In a majority of G20 countries, migrant women have lower employment rates than both native-born women and their male counterparts.
- New OECD on migrant stocks show that in 2015/16, a fifth of 150 million foreign-born residents aged 15 and over in G20 countries come from just five countries (Mexico, India, Bangladesh, Ukraine and China). Almost one in three foreign-born have a tertiary level of education.
- Some countries in Central America and the Caribbean or Africa have emigration rates of tertiary graduates to G20 countries that exceed 40% and nearly 30 countries have rates above 20%.
- What is more, there is a marked difference in the emigration rates of tertiary graduates by sex, particularly for those from non-G20 countries. The emigration rate for tertiary educated women is 20.4% while that for men is 16.4%.
- As compared to other financial flows, remittance volumes to developing countries are large and have risen steadily over the last 3 decades from USD 126 billion (1990) to USD 528 billion (2018).
- Remittance costs continue to be over the SDG target of 3% globally.

### **Implications for migration and refugee movements linked to ongoing demographic and technological trends**

- The median age of the population in G20 countries has increased on average by 10 years between 1980 and 2015; it is projected to increase further by at least seven more years between 2015 and 2050.
- International migration, notably labour migration, is often seen as one way, in conjunction with other policies, to address demographic imbalances but evidence shows that it cannot be the only policy response to population ageing in G20 countries.
- Matching labour surplus in origin countries with skills needs in destination countries is challenging and will require reinforcing the links between labour migration management and skills development tools.
- Automation may reduce the long term need for international recruitment of low skilled workers but may have some paradoxical effects in the short and medium term. New forms of 'digital labour migration' are being created through the outsourcing of tasks and work across national borders that also need to be regulated.
- Digitalisation is impacting migrant workers through the use of digital migration management and skills matching platforms, the development of apps as awareness raising and tools to facilitate remittances transfers.
- New technologies are also affecting immigration management and enforcement notably through biometric technologies.

# Introduction

2018 G20 leaders’ declaration (Buenos Aires, Argentina) “noted the 2018 G20 Annual International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report prepared by the OECD in cooperation with ILO, IOM and UNHCR and stressed that large movements of refugees are a global concern with humanitarian, political, social and economic consequences. G20 leaders emphasized the importance of shared actions to address the root causes of displacement and to respond to growing humanitarian needs.”

In 2018-2019 protracted humanitarian crises around the world and large-scale displacements notably in the Americas have contributed to fuel these concerns. In the meantime, G20 countries are facing key mega-trends linked to demographic and technological changes that will affect migration going forward.


The 2019 edition of the joint OECD, ILO, IOM & UNHCR *International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report* is composed of four main parts. The first part of the report presents the latest figures on migration and refugee flows and stocks in G20 countries, including student migration and forced displacement. The second part analyses the latest trends regarding labour market integration of migrants and refugees in G20 countries. The third part includes new data on diasporas by countries of origin and presents the latest remittance trends. The fourth part analyses the implications for migration and forced displacement of ongoing demographic and technological trends. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

## 1. Recent trends in migration and refugee movements in G20 countries

### a. Migration flows in 2017 and 2018

**Preliminary data indicate a small increase in overall migration flows to G20 countries in 2018<sup>1</sup>** (Figure 1 and Table 1). The United States remained the main G20 destination country with around 2.2 million new migrants arriving in 2018. After a peak above 2.3 million in 2016, migration flows to the United States decreased slightly for the second consecutive year. At 1.4 million, new permanent and temporary migration flows to Germany were stable in 2018 and remained higher than in any year prior to 2015. About 60% of these new migrants were citizens of another EU country. Labour migration from Asia to Saudi Arabia is one of the main migration channels in the G20 an account for a large share of the 1.8 million residence permits issued annually.

**Figure 1. Recent changes in migration flows to selected G20 countries, 2016-2018**



Source: see Table 1 below.

<sup>1</sup> Data on international migration flows are not available for all G20 countries and are not systematically comparable. The data presented here are compiled from many different sources, notably based on OECD regional monitoring systems, completed with national sources. They include all types of migration ranging from settlement to temporary migration, including students, but exclude visitors.

**Table 1. Migration flows to selected G20 countries, 2010-2018, thousands**

											% change			ermaneremparatudents	Definition & Source	
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2016-17	2017-18					
EU	2 473	2 177	2 097	2 356	2 326	2 622	3 019	3 133		4						Eurostat - All first permits to TCN
United States	1 897	1 971	1 976	2 031	2 163	2 292	2 315	2 212	2 178	- 4	- 2	1	1	1		Department of Homeland Security/ Department of State
Saudi Arabia	1 640	1 412	1 922	1 840	1 962	2 213	1 823	1 843		1				1		Residence permits. Ministry of Interior
Germany	684	842	966	1 108	1 343	2 016	1 720	1 412	1 416	- 18	0	1	1	1		Registration of foreigners intending to stay at least one week in the country. Destatis
Australia	580	608	698	768	773	765	756	770	752	2	- 2	1	1	1		Department of Immigration and Border Protection
Canada	482	458	488	494	487	490	549	539	573	- 2	6	1	1	1		IRCC
Spain	330	336	272	248	264	290	352	454	562	29	24	1				Long-term inflows (more than 90 days); Ministry of Justice
Korea	293	307	300	360	407	373	402	453	556	13	23	1	1	1		National Institute of Statistics
United Kingdom	498	488	418	449	551	548	515	563	542	9	- 4	1		1		Long-Term International Migration; Office for National Statistics
Japan	287	267	304	307	337	391	428	475	520	11	9	1	1	1		Foreigners who entered the country, excluding temporary visitors and re-entries; Ministry of Justice
Russian Federation	192	206	283	346	439	421	384	391	375	2	- 4	1				Federal Migration Service
Italy	424	354	321	279	248	250	263	301		15		1		1		Istat
France	197	193	193	205	211	218	230	247	256	7	3	1	1	1		Non-EU citizens only; Ministry of Interior
Argentina	178	259	292	279	206	269	223	221		- 1		1	1	1		Ministry of Interior
Turkey	50	74	96	95	199	164	177									
Brazil	96	117	133	148	133	137	108					1	1	1		Ministry of Justice
Mexico	92	91	79	118	109	103	101	102	103	1	1	1	1	1		Permanent resident cards +temp; SEGOB - Unidad de política migratoria
South Africa		118	145	111	83	75						1	1	1		Department of Home Affairs
Indonesia	65	77	72	69										1		Registered migrant worker; ILO
Total	8 442	8 141	8 884	9 322	9 694	10 384	10 429	10 567								
% change to previous year		-3.6%	9.1%	4.9%	4.0%	7.1%	0.4%	1.3%								

Sources: National sources; OECD International Migration Database, OAS/OECD (2017) International migration in the Americas - SICREMI, ADBI/ILO/OECD (2019) Building Partnerships for Effectively Managing Labor Migration.

Note: Sources, definitions and coverage of data used vary significantly across countries. This does not allow for aggregations and direct comparisons, but order of magnitude and trends can be described. Data are generally based on national sources, and most often include temporary workers and students. N/A means that information is not available. Inflows to Turkey are estimates based on Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labour reports.

**Recently, the evolution of migration flows diverged across G20 countries.** In 2018 Australia recorded a 2% drop, but still received over 750 000 new permanent and temporary migrants. Since 2013, annual migration flows to Australia were comprised between 750 000 and 800 000 people. The United Kingdom also received more than half a million new migrants in 2018 (540 000). This represents, however, a 4% drop compared to 2017, resulting from a 19% drop of inflows from within the EU and an 8% increase of non-EU migration. Migration also declined by about 2% in the United States between 2017 and 2018.

Large increases in migration flows were registered in Korea and Spain (about +25%), and to a lesser extent in Japan (+9%). In these three countries, immigration flows in 2018 were almost double what they were at the beginning of the 2010s. Immigration of non-EU nationals to France increased each year since 2012 and stood just over 250 000 in 2018. Immigration to Canada increased to almost 575 000 people in 2018 (+6% compared to 2017), the highest level recorded. Mexico received just over 100 000 new migrants, as is the case since 2015.

### Box 1 Global estimates of migrant workers


The ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers report is part of a broader ILO effort to enhance the global harmonization, collection and production of labour migration statistics. They are also part of the implementation of the new *Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration*, adopted by the 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in October 2018.

In 2017, the ILO estimates that there were 164 million migrant workers worldwide. Migrant workers accounted for 4.7 per cent of all workers. The stock of male migrant workers was estimated to be 95.7 million, while the corresponding estimate for female migrant workers was 68.1 million, or 58.4 and 41.6 per cent, respectively.


When disaggregating migrant workers by age group, 86.5 per cent of migrant workers were prime-age adults (ages 25-64). While the participation rates of male migrants and non-migrants were both at par (75.5 per cent and 75.2 per cent, respectively), a difference of 15.4 percentage points was observed between the participation rates of migrant and non-migrant women (63.5 per cent and 48.1 per cent, respectively).

Most of the migrant workers are concentrated in high-income countries -- 67.9 per cent. 60.8 per cent of all migrant workers are found in three sub-regions: Northern America (23.0 per cent), Northern, Southern and Western Europe (23.9 per cent) and the Arab States (13.9 per cent). The sub-region with the largest share of migrant workers as a proportion of all workers is the Arab States (40.8 per cent).

Migrant workers, by income level of countries, 2017



Distribution of migrant workers, by broad subregion, 2017



Source: ILO (2018a)

*b. Enrolment of international students in G20 countries*

**In 2016, over 4 million international students were enrolled in tertiary education in the G20** (Table 2). This is almost half a million more than in 2015 – or a 13% increase. Just less than one in four students were enrolled in the United States, while the European Union together represented 40% of all international student enrolments in the G20. Among the major receiving countries are the United Kingdom (432 000), Australia (336 000) and the Russian Federation (250 000). Between 2015 and 2016, the number of international students in Germany increased by 16 000, thereby reaching the level of France (245 000).

**More than half of international students in the G20 come from another G20 country.** This share is particularly high in English-speaking countries, as well as in some Asian G20 countries. One in two international tertiary-level students in Brazil and Spain come from the Americas, while Europeans represent a large share of the international student population in Germany (40%) and Italy (45%). Asian students dominate in Japan (93%), Korea (91%), Australia (87%), the United States (77%), and Turkey (72%). Among all G20 countries, African students are the largest group only in France.

**Overall, international students account for an average of 7% of the tertiary-level student population in the G20.** This is a significant increase compared to an average of 3% in the previous year. This proportion reaches 9% in the European Union, and 18% in the United Kingdom. In contrast, international students still represent an insignificant share in Asian countries, in Latin America (Brazil and Mexico) and in Turkey.

**The proportion of international students increases as they reach higher education levels.** On average in the G20, international students account for 14% of students enrolled in Master's programmes, and 27% in PhD programmes. In several countries – such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States – more than two in five PhD students are international students.

**Table 2. International students enrolled in G20 countries, 2016**

Number of international or foreign students (in thousands)	Of which from (%)								International or foreign students as a share of all students (%)		
	G20	Americas	Europe	Africa	Oceania	Asia	Not allocated	Total tertiary	Master's level	Doctoral level	
Argentina	76	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Australia	336	61	4	4	2	1	87	1	17	46	34
Brazil	20	31	51	13	25	0	11	0	0	1	2
Canada	189	69	10	13	11	0	61	4	12	18	32
China	138	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	..	..
France	245	37	8	20	42	0	21	8	10	13	40
Germany	245	57	8	40	9	0	36	7	8	13	9
India	45	8	4	2	26	0	69	0	0	..	..
Indonesia	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	93	47	10	45	13	0	32	0	5	5	14
Japan	143	70	2	3	1	0	93	0	4	7	18
Korea	62	74	4	2	3	0	91	0	2	7	9
Mexico	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	1	3
Russian Federation	250	8	0	19	3	0	70	8	4	4	5
Saudi Arabia	80	11	2	4	31	0	63	0	5	..	..
South Africa	45	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spain	53	52	47	39	6	0	8	0	3	8	15
Turkey	88	11	1	13	14	0	72	1	1	4	7
United Kingdom	432	64	7	33	8	1	52	0	18	36	43
United States	971	75	11	7	5	1	77	0	5	10	40
European Union (OECD)	1591	56	8	42	12	0	31	6	9	13	23
<b>G20 total</b>	<b>4052</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>G20 average</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20</b>

*Note:* Data for Argentina, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey refer to foreign students instead of international students. Data for Argentina, Indonesia and South Africa come from UIS database.

*Source:* Education at a Glance database, OECD.

*c. Refugee stocks, asylum applications, resettlement and complementary pathways for those in need of international protection*


**By mid-2018, the global refugee population reached 25.7 million**, including 5.5 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate. It is the highest level recorded to date and an increase of 300 000 from the end of 2017. To address the challenges associated with forced displacement and humanitarian crises the question of solidarity and responsibility sharing remains top of the international agenda. G20 countries hosted 7.3 million refugees, representing about 36 per cent of all refugees under UNHCR’s mandate. About half of them were in Turkey.

Turkey continued to be the country hosting the world’s largest number of people in need of international protection, with a continued increase to 3.6 million people from the end of 2017(Figure 2), including 3 532 500 Syrians.

The second largest refugee-hosting country among G20 countries and the fourth-largest in the world was Germany, where the refugee population reached just over one million by the middle of 2018. The rate of increase has significantly slowed down compared to previous years due to a lower number of positive decisions on asylum claims and of resettlement arrivals. At the middle of the year, the majority of refugees hosted by Germany came from Syria (514 000), followed by Iraq (134 000), Afghanistan (116 700), Eritrea (53 100), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (40 000). France had the third-largest refugee population among G20 countries with a population of 355 200. The most-common origin was Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan and the Russian Federation.


The number of refugees hosted by each country can be compared relative to its national population size<sup>2</sup>. As such, the impact of the Syrian crisis can clearly be seen on Turkey with 44 refugees per 1 000 inhabitants, the highest among all G20 countries (Figure 3). Sweden also has a relatively high proportion of refugees with 24 per 1 000, followed by Malta (19), Austria (14), and Germany (12).

**Figure 2. Major host countries of refugees among G20 countries**



Source: UNHCR

**Figure 3 number of refugees per 1 000 inhabitants, top G20 countries mid 2018**



<sup>2</sup> National population data are from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, ‘World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision’, New York, 2017. For the purpose of this analysis, the 2017 medium fertility variant population projections have been used. See: <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/>.




## Box 2. The right to quality education for refugees

The 1951 Refugee Convention Article 21 provides that refugees should have equal access to primary education as nationals, and right to secondary and other forms of education on par with foreign nationals in the same circumstances. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 28, and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Article 13, goes further, and provides that every child has the right to education, including free and compulsory primary education, progressively free secondary education, and access to higher education based on individual capacity.

Over 50% of refugees are under the age of 18, and they are five times more likely to be out of school than their peers. Four million refugee children are out of school, with 77% of refugee youth not in secondary education. These percentages are seriously below the global averages, limiting opportunities for millions of children and young people, jeopardizing their lives and reducing opportunities for social cohesion and peacebuilding.

World leaders have promised to fulfil the right that children have to an education – a cornerstone of the Sustainable Development Goals. In the 2016 [New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants](#) and the [Global Compact on Refugees](#), governments pledged to share responsibility for the world's refugees and to improve access to education for refugee children and youth. The Global Compact on Refugees provides an opportunity to make a significant step-change, reaffirms international commitment to *expand and enhance the quality and inclusiveness of national education systems to facilitate access by refugee and host community children (both boys and girls)...and youth to primary, secondary and tertiary education*. This aligns directly with the goal of SDG-Education 2030 on inclusive, equitable access to quality education.



Source: Data extracted from the 2018 UNHCR report [Turn the tide: Refugee Education in Crisis](#)

*During the first half of 2018, there were an estimated 879 600 new claims for asylum lodged globally* with States or UNHCR in 'first instance' procedures, of which some 646 400 million were in G20 countries<sup>3</sup>. The United States was the largest recipient of new asylum applications, with 137 600 lodged until the middle of 2018<sup>4</sup>. This number is lower than the number of applications received in the comparable period in 2017 (174 900). Similar to the previous year, applicants from the North of Central America<sup>5</sup> made up 55 per cent of all claims in the United States. Salvadorans made up the largest nationality of applicants with 20 400 claims, a substantial increase on the 15 600 submitted in the first half 2017. Guatemalans and Hondurans were the next largest groups with 16 800 and 13 500 claims, respectively. Claims from Venezuelans remained high with 14 000 claims, reflecting the challenging conditions in the country (Box 3).

Germany continued to experience a decline in applications with 81 800 new applications in the first six months of the year 2018, while having had the third-highest number of claims globally (after Peru) and the second among the G20 countries. Applications peaked in 2016 when 387 700 applications were received in the first half of the year and 101 000 were lodged in the equivalent period in 2017. Syria continued to be the most common country of origin and represented 26 per cent of all applications with 21 600 applications in Germany, similar to the first half of 2017 when 23 600 applications were received. The second most common country of origin was Iraq with 8 300 applications compared with 10 000 in the same period of the previous year.

<sup>3</sup> The data for some countries may include a significant number of repeat claims, i.e. the applicant has submitted at least one previous application in the same or another country.

<sup>4</sup> Estimated number of individuals based on the number of new cases (50 900) and multiplied by 1,501 to reflect the average number of individuals per case (Source: US Department of Homeland Security); and number of new 'defensive' asylum requests lodged with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (61 100, reported by individuals).

<sup>5</sup> El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras

### **Box 3 Outflows from Venezuela and requirement of international protection**

People continue to leave the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela due to the complex socioeconomic, human rights and political situation. Since 2015, 2.7 million Venezuelans have left, mainly to neighbouring countries, with no prospects of return in the short to medium term. Their primary destinations were Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, the Caribbean, Costa Rica, Mexico, Spain, and the United States of America. According to figures provided by host governments, more than 400 000 Venezuelans lodged new asylum claims since the beginning of 2014, and nearly 60 percent of them (248 000), during 2018 alone. Two thirds of asylum applications by Venezuelans were registered in Latin America and the rest in North America and some European countries. By the end of 2018, Latin American countries had granted some 1.3 million residence permits and other forms of regular status to Venezuelans. However, the majority remains in an irregular situation. Without access to a legal status, they are at a higher risk of violence, exploitation, sexual abuse, forced labour, trafficking, and discrimination. While the responses of States are generous, host communities receiving Venezuelans are under increasing strain as they extend assistance, such as food and shelter, and services, including access to health and education systems, to those arriving. More support by the international community is needed to complement their efforts.

Source : All figures are available at the regional inter-agency coordination platform : [r4v.info](http://r4v.info)

France was the third-largest recipient of asylum claims among G20 countries in the first half of 2018 with 60 200 new applications. This compares with 43 300 in the same period in 2017, an increase of nearly 40 per cent. The number of applications from Afghans increased from 3 100 to 5 000, from the first half of 2017 to the same period in 2018. At the same time, the number of applications from Albanians decreased from 6 100 to 3 300 making it the second most common country of origin.

Turkey received the fourth largest number of new individual asylum applications among G20 countries, registered with UNHCR and the Government of Turkey. As per UNHCR registration data, the Office registered 52 400 new asylum applications in the country during the first half of 2018, an increase compared to the 42 200 received in the same period the previous year. As in previous years, the majority of these applications were from nationals of Afghanistan with 30 400 applications.

Other G20 and EU countries receiving large numbers of new asylum applicants in the first half of 2018 were Brazil (32 400), Italy (31 500), Greece (29 300), Spain (26 200) and Canada (26 200).

***There were 3.2 million asylum-seekers with pending claims as of mid-2018***, a slight increase of the 3.1 million awaiting decisions at the end of 2017, and of the 3 million pending applications at mid-year 2017.

The largest asylum-seeker population at the middle of 2018 was in the United States, where pending claims have continued to increase with 657 200 people, an increase of some 14 500 compared with the end of the previous year. Germany had the second-largest asylum-seeker population with 394 100, a decline of 35 200 from the end of 2017, as the processing of the large number of applications received in 2016 continued. Other G20 countries with large numbers of asylum-seekers at mid-2018 included Turkey (301 900), South Africa (184 200), Italy (131 900), and Brazil (113 200), the latter reflecting the large influx of Venezuelans applicants in the past year.

***Resettlement continues to be a critical protection tool***, providing solutions for refugees who have fled from their countries of origin, and are unable to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution. Resettlement is also a tangible mechanism for international solidarity and responsibility-sharing between resettlement countries and states hosting large numbers of refugees.

In this context, more than 1.4 million refugees have been identified by UNHCR as needing access to this key durable solution. Syrians constitute the largest refugee population in need of resettlement (601 200), followed by Congolese (DRC) (163 400) and South Sudanese (158 500). UNHCR estimates that at the current pace, it will take 18 years for the 1.4 million refugees to be resettled.

Against the high resettlement needs identified, only 81 300 refugee cases were submitted for resettlement consideration during 2018, the majority of which are to G20 countries. This compares to 163 300 submissions only two years ago. This dramatic drop reflects a fluctuation in global resettlement places and represents a

significant decrease in global resettlement opportunities, including among G20 countries. The United States remained the main recipient during 2018 with 29 000 refugee cases submitted by UNHCR, followed by Canada (14 300) and the United Kingdom (6 300). Member states of the European Union together received 28 400 or 35 per cent of all UNHCR resettlement submissions in 2018.

In 2018 UNHCR and IOM worked together to assist 55 600 refugees to actually depart for resettlement in 2018, notably to the United States of America (17,100), Canada (7 700) and the United Kingdom (5 700). This is the lowest number in more than a decade. The G20 countries received 92 per cent of all resettled refugees.

***In addition to traditional refugee resettlement, complementary pathways for admission of refugees have become key to expand access to third country solutions.*** The notion of complementary pathways - which includes family reunification, student visas, labour mobility, and community sponsorship – is reinforced in the New York Declaration (2016) and the Global Compact on Refugees (2018). UNHCR and OECD published a study in December 2018 that examined the use of complementary pathways for admission by refugees to third countries (OECD-UNHCR 2018)<sup>6</sup>. The study focuses on first entry permits granted for family, study or work purposes in OECD destination countries from 2010-2017 to nationals from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic. These nationalities were selected because they account for more than half of the world’s refugees under UNHCR mandate and have a high rate of refugee status recognition for those applying for asylum in OECD countries.

**Figure 4. First permits granted by OECD countries (34) to Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis and Syrians by permit type between 2010 and 2017**



Source : OECD-UNHCR (2018)

Findings from this report (Figure 4) conclude that the use of complementary pathways by the five populations groups was high in scope, while there remains significant potential for expansion. Between 2010 and 2017, the combined total of submitted asylum applications in OECD countries of the five populations totalled more than 2.5 million, including 322 300 (13%) on appeal following a negative decision at the first-instance asylum body. More than 1.5 million were granted either refugee status (890 000) or complementary forms of protection (633 000) during this period. This compares to a total of 566 900 first residence permits granted to the five populations for family (487 300 permits), work (25 400 permits), or education-related reasons (54 200 permits). During the same period, 350 400 persons from the five populations arrived in OECD countries through resettlement processes.

<sup>6</sup> The findings will support the development of the 3-year Strategy envisaged by the Global Compact on Refugees to expand Resettlement and Complementary Pathways. Data will be updated on a regular basis, with the report intended to be issued by UNHCR-OECD every two years. The next report will be completed in 2020, covering 2018-2019 data.

#### Box 4. G20 and Migration, Environment and Climate Change

Every year, natural hazards, such as floods, storms and earthquakes, force millions of people to leave their homes and seek assistance and protection elsewhere. Slow onset phenomena such as drought, sea level rise, coastal erosion and land and ecosystem degradation add further stress on people's lives and livelihoods, leading to migration. In addition, the adverse effects of climate change are intensifying the severity of natural hazards and sometimes increasing their frequency. Predictions for the twenty-first century indicate that even more people will have to move as a result of the changing environment, unless greenhouse gas emissions are reduced (IPCC 2018).

G20 Members have experienced loss and damage associated with both sudden and slow-onset disasters, including the adverse effects of climate change. Estimates compiled by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) report that in 2017 alone almost 8.5 million people have been newly displaced by sudden-onset disasters within the borders of G20 countries. China, India, Indonesia, Japan and the United States account for most of the displacement across 2016, 2017 and 2018. The gap between these five countries and the rest of the G20 Members is very significant, with a difference of more than 1 million displacements between the fifth country (Japan, 1 371 000) and the sixth country (Mexico, 298 000). Climate and weather-related disasters, especially floods and storms, represent the main drivers of these forced movements.

Slow-onset events and processes are also contributing to migration in G20 countries, in particular from rural to urban areas. Such migration is difficult to quantify due to the complex interplay of environmental, social, economic and political factors and due to the variety of forms it can take (seasonal or temporary migration, permanent relocation, international migration); however, a growing number of studies aimed at quantifying such trends points to the likely intensification of migration and displacement due to slow onset processes in the future (Rigaud and al. 2018).

In recent years, important advances have been made on clarifying the links between migration, environment and climate change and identifying solutions both at policy and operational levels. In December 2018, the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP24) endorsed a set of recommendations from the Task Force on Displacement (TFD) of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM). The TFD's recommendations invite states to integrate climate related human mobility challenges and opportunities into national planning processes by drawing on available tools, guidance, and good practices; and consider communicating these efforts undertaken, as appropriate. The recommendations also aim to encourage strengthened coordination within the UN system to support these efforts, and call for "coherence within the UN system on addressing human mobility in the context of climate change". ILO, IOM, UNDP and UNHCR, and PDD have provided technical support to the Task Force, which has been renewed for another term to support guidance on implementation.



Number of New Internal Displacements in G20 Member Countries				
Rank	G20 Member	2015 Estimate	2016 Estimate	2017 Estimate
9.	Argentina	36,000	12,000	27,000
10.	Australia	5,700	3,100	31,000
8.	Brazil	59,000	14,000	71,000
7.	Canada	13,000	93,000	85,000
1.	China	3,602,000	7,434,000	4,473,000
14.	France	100	190	22,000
18.	Germany	/	2,000	220
2.	India	3,655,000	2,400,000	1,346,000
4.	Indonesia	204,000	1,246,000	365,000
11.	Italy	1,300	31,000	2,100
5.	Japan	486,000	864,000	21,000
6.	Mexico	91,000	12,000	195,000
17.	Republic of Korea	/	7,500	4,300
13.	Republic of South Africa	14	12,000	15,000
15.	Russia	6,600	3,600	5,900
20.	Saudi Arabia	/	280	100
19.	Turkey	1,500	200	/
16.	United Kingdom	6,100	1,200	6,200
3.	United States of America	63,000	1,107,000	1,686,000
12.	European Union (EU) - without France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom	8,110	10,964	10,110
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>8,238,424</b>	<b>13,254,034</b>	<b>8,365,930</b>

Source: Author calculations based on the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

States have made commitments to address environmental migration and disaster displacement in international migration policy and disaster and climate change policies, including in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. In line with these commitments, G20 countries can play an important role at global, regional and national levels in promoting policies and measures supporting disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and migration governance, which together can help to prepare for and tackle environmental migration and disasters displacement, while also minimizing the drivers of migration caused by climate change.


Sources : IOM, IPCC, UNHCR, World Bank and IDMC <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report>

## 2. Immigrant skills and labour market integration

### a. Recent evidence on migrant labour market integration in selected G20 countries

**Over the past years, the global labour market situation has improved in a large number of G20 countries.** In 2018, the G20 unemployment rate has decreased from 7.7% of the labour force in 2017 to 7.4% in 2018 (Figure 5). However, South Africa, with still more than a quarter of its labour force in unemployment, as well as Italy, Turkey and France with around one in ten active persons in unemployment are still facing major challenges.

**Figure 5. Unemployment rates, Percentage of labour force, December 2007 to the latest data available**



Argentina: Selected urban areas. According to the National Statistical Authority (INDEC), LFS series published after the first quarter of 2007 and until the fourth quarter of 2015 must be considered with caution.

Note: Figures shown in this Chart refer to 2010 only for China; 2007/08 and 2011/12 for India; August 2007 and February 2018 for Indonesia; the second semester of 2007 and Q2 2018 for Saudi Arabia; Q3 2018 only for Brazil; Q4 2007 and Q2 2018 for Argentina; Q4 2007 and Q3 2018 for the Russian Federation; Q1 2008 and Q3 2018 for South Africa; December 2007 and September 2018 for Turkey and the United Kingdom; December 2007 and November 2018 for Australia, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Spain; December 2007 and December 2018 for Canada and the United States.

Source: OECD Short-Term Labour Market Statistics for Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. OECD Employment Database, <http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm> for China and India (CWS); OECD estimates based on microdata of the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) for Argentina; and national results from the PNAD Continua for Brazil, the labour force survey (Sakernas) for Indonesia, the Labour Force Survey for Saudi Arabia and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey for South Africa.

### **On average, in the G20 area, foreign-born are more likely to be employed than their native-born peers.**

For G20 countries where data are available, on average two thirds of migrants are in employment compared to 62% of the native-born peers. This relatively favourable outcome is also reflected in lower unemployment rates among immigrants (7.2% of the foreign-born labour force, compared with 9.1% of the natives). Comparison of average labour market outcomes between immigrants and native-born should be taken with some caution because of the large discrepancies between the two groups in some G20 countries. Beyond averages, some challenges remain in some countries and for immigrant sub-groups within countries.

In few countries, such as South Africa, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and Brazil, immigrants experience significantly better labour market outcomes than their native peers. In some other G20 countries where migration is primarily labour-driven, such as Argentina and Korea, migrant labour market outcomes are only slightly better than those of their native peers. In OECD settlement countries as well as in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, more than 70% of working-age immigrants are in employment but they still slightly lag behind their native peers in terms of employment rate. In most other European countries as well as in Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia the labour market integration of migrants and refugees is significantly lower than for the rest of the population.

Over the course of 2018, the employment gap between the foreign- and the native-born populations has decreased in a majority of G20 countries for which an evolution can be calculated.

**Table 3. Labour market outcomes by place of birth, 2018 or latest available year**


	Foreign-born			Native-born		
	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Participation rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate	Participation rate
Argentina	8.1	68.6	74.6	8.9	62.1	68.2
Australia	5.5	72.0	76.2	5.4	74.9	79.2
Brazil	4.8	66.2	69.5	11.1	61.1	68.7
Canada	6.4	72.3	77.3	5.7	74.4	78.9
EU28	10.6	66.0	73.8	6.5	68.9	73.7
France	14.7	58.5	68.5	8.3	66.4	72.5
Germany	6.1	69.3	73.7	3.0	77.3	79.7
Indonesia	10.4	52.9	59.1	11.0	63.8	71.7
Italy	13.4	61.2	70.7	10.3	58.1	64.8
Japan	5.4	69.6	73.5	4.4	73.2	76.5
Korea	4.6	70.9	74.3	4.0	67.3	70.1
Mexico	3.9	52.2	54.4	3.4	61.5	63.7
Russian Federation	7.8	69.0	74.9	8.9	67.0	73.6
Saudi Arabia	0.6	76.2	76.7	11.9	37.5	42.5
South Africa	17.7	64.0	83.1	30.8	38.3	65.1
Turkey	11.7	48.2	54.6	10.6	52.4	58.6
United Kingdom	4.8	73.6	77.3	4.0	74.8	78.0
United States	3.5	71.6	74.2	4.1	69.2	72.2
<b>G20 average</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>71.9</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>68.3</b>

Note: European countries, Turkey and Mexico: the rates refer to the period Q1-Q3. Foreign nationals and not foreign-born individuals in Japan and Saudi Arabia. Korean data refer to foreign nationals plus individuals who naturalised over the last five years (2018 data). 2015 data for Japan; 2016 data for Saudi Arabia; Russia (2010); South Africa (2011); Argentina (Selected urban areas, Q4 2017-Q3 2018); Indonesia and Brazil (2010).

Sources: EULFS Q1-Q3; Australia, Canada, European countries, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Turkey, United States: International Migration Outlook 2019, OECD, forthcoming; Argentina: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Q4 2017-Q3 2018; Brazil, Indonesia: IPUMS Censuses 2010; South Africa: IPUMS Census 2011; Russian Federation: Census 2010; Saudi Arabia: Labour Force Survey 2016.

***In a majority of G20 countries, migrant women face specific difficulties to integrate into the labour market.***

The gap in participation rates between native-born and foreign-born women is particularly large in Germany and France where it is over 10 percentage points. With the notable exception of South Africa, Argentina and Italy, they participate substantially less in the labour market than their native-born peers. Saudi Arabia is also an exception in a context of low participation of both population groups (Figure 6).

**Figure 6. Participation rate of native- and foreign-born women, 2018** Percentage of the 15-64 population


Notes and sources: refer to Table 3.

According to OECD/EU (2018), across the G20, nearly two in five immigrants and native-born of working-age have only lower secondary education. At the same time, around 30% of immigrants are tertiary educated, which compares with a quarter of the native-born population on average in the G20. There are however important differences across G20 countries. While a majority of immigrants are low educated in Argentina, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and Italy, the reverse is true in OECD settlement countries, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent in the United States. In the European Union the share of tertiary educated

immigrants and native born are at par (29%) but immigrants are slightly over-represented among the low educated (34% versus 32%).

**Individuals holding a higher level of education tend to achieve better labour market outcomes.** Across G20 countries, low-educated immigrants are twice as likely to be unemployed than their peers with a tertiary diploma (Figure 7). On average, however, highly educated immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than their native-born peers. This reflects the fact that foreign qualifications are often discounted on host country labour markets.

**Figure 7. Unemployment rates by level of education, 2018, Percentages of 15-64 labour force**




### b. Evidence on refugee labour market integration

**The skills of refugees can represent significant economic potential for destination countries.** However, they face specific challenges and their labour market integration takes time and requires coordinated active support<sup>7</sup> from a range of actors and entities.

The latest data available before the 2015/16 refugee surge in Europe show that 56% of refugees in Europe were in employment, with large differences by gender and skill level (Figure 8). In Canada, 57% of refugees were in employment in 2016. For the same year, only a third of recently arrived refugees (arrived since less than ten years) were in employment in Australia.

<sup>7</sup> The ILO and UNHCR developed the Guide to Market-based Livelihoods Interventions for Refugees which serves as a framework to help practitioners in developing market-driven interventions adapted to the local context and labor market. A training course based on the guide is offered at the ILO Training Centre in Turin on an annual basis. <https://www.unhcr.org/594b7d7f7.pdf>

**Figure 8 Employment of refugees and migrants in Europe by gender and skill levels, 2014**



Source : OECD/EU (2016)

*The right to access employment opportunities is explicitly established* for refugees in the 1951 Refugee Convention, in Articles 17, 18 and 19, while Article 24 of the 1951 Refugee Convention sets out refugees' rights to just and favourable conditions of work. Under international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Article 23, provides that everyone has the right to work, and to just and favourable conditions of work. Human rights norms, including international labour standards, support ILO's decent work agenda, which includes ensuring protection of workers' fundamental principles and rights at work. The Committee for the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) interprets Article 6 of the ICESCR to provide a right to work, while rights to just and favourable conditions of work are regulated by Article 7<sup>8</sup>. The ILO has developed over 200 international labour standards. To support Member States, the ILO's Governing Body endorsed in October- November 2016 the *Guiding Principles on the Access of Refugees and Other Forcibly Displaced Persons to the Labour Market* previously adopted by the tripartite technical meeting. The Guiding Principles are addressed to all Member States of the ILO as well as employers' and workers' organizations as a basis for the formulation of policy responses and national tripartite dialogue on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market. The international labour conference also adopted in 2017 *Recommendation No. 205 on Employment and decent work for peace and resilience*.

In addition to restrictions imposed by laws and policies, labor market access by refugees in destination countries is also hindered by multiple factors such as local economic conditions, language barriers and mismatched or insufficient skills as well as in some cases complex administrative procedures. This is the case notably for the recognition and validation of credits, certificates, competences and degrees. More generally, in some countries access to national education systems may be restricted. Providing opportunities for all recently arrived refugees remains a challenge especially in countries, which have received large influxes (Box 5). Entrepreneurship offers an alternative route to accelerate economic integration of refugees. Refugees indeed often bring with them a culture of doing business and sector-specific expertise.

***Programs to encourage and support refugee entrepreneurship are emerging across multiple host countries including in G20 countries.*** A study at Maastricht University identified 30 refugee entrepreneurship incubator programs that engaged over 12 000 refugees in Australia, United States and Europe (Ormiston, 2017). Several other studies show evidence of increasing rates of refugee entrepreneurship in host countries. In the United Kingdom, migrant entrepreneurs including refugee entrepreneurs are creating one in seven new

<sup>8</sup> The right to work includes the opportunity for people to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted and encompasses all forms of work, both independent self-employment and dependent wage-paid work. When they have an opportunity to work, everyone must be able to work safely, with respect for human rights and free from exploitation, violence and harassment. Of particular importance is being remunerated fairly and receiving equal pay for work of equal value and reasonable and healthy terms and conditions of work. Everyone, including refugees, should have equal access to decent work opportunities, without discrimination.



businesses. Further research shows that about 20% of refugees in the labour market are self-employed, similar to the rate among migrants (Centre for Entrepreneurs, 2018). A similar trend is observed in Germany where one in five new businesses are funded by migrants and refugees, according to KfW (Copley, 2016). In Australia, the proportion of refugees earning income from entrepreneurial activities is five percentage points higher than among all migrants (Collins, 2017). In Canada, while there are no available statistics on refugee entrepreneurs, there is anecdotal evidence on increased entrepreneurial activities especially among Syrian refugees, in restaurant and catering businesses (Nadeem 2018).

To respond to a growing policy need for a common approach to promoting the socioeconomic inclusion of migrants and refugees, UNCTAD, UNHCR and IOM have brought together their technical expertise and practical knowledge to develop a Policy Guide on Entrepreneurship for Migrants and Refugees (2018). The guide emphasizes the importance of evolving entrepreneurship ecosystems to be inclusive of migrants and refugees rather than creating separate or parallel programmes tailored to these groups.

Voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity in post conflict situations is also part of providing durable solution for people in need of protection as stated in the Global Compact on Refugees<sup>9</sup>. Recently, many governments have started to acknowledge that reintegration is key for the return to be sustainable for all parties involved. It reduces incentives for re-migration and makes the acceptance of return more likely, both for the migrants concerned and for the origin communities. Areas of origin can be more attractive for return when they are secure and offer opportunities for development. Creating safety areas with economic potential in the absence of overall political solution in post conflict situations can indeed prepare the ground for sustainable reintegration.

#### **Box 5 Outlook of Syrians and other people in need of international protection in Turkey and ILO's Refugee Response Programme**

Turkey is host to the highest number of people in need of international protection in the world for the fifth year in a row with over 3.6 million Syrians under temporary protection and around 350 000 people from other countries.. Turkish officials indicate that they have spent over USD 37 billion to the refugees from its own resources. Syrians under temporary protection have free access to the health-care services in Turkey. Syrian babies that were born in Turkey exceeded 405.000. There are more than 1 million school-age Syrian children in Turkey and around 648.000 of them can attend school. The school enrollment rate doubled from 30% in 2014-2015 to 62% in 2018-2019.

With the Syrian refugee situation becoming increasingly protracted, the focus has increasingly been placed towards building refugees' resilience through prioritizing the livelihoods sector and refugees' access to the labour market. In the Turkish context, this means strengthening linkages between the protection/basic needs sectors under the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) country chapter and the livelihoods sector, so that protection issues and basic needs are addressed and durable solutions are found.

In 2013, Turkey's Law on Foreigners and International Protection was endorsed by the Parliament and entered into force on 11 April 2014. By 2016 people under temporary protection were granted the ability to obtain work permits—a significant step in their access to the formal labour market and in achieving self-reliance. Since then, the government has shown strong leadership in response to the arrival of refugees, and UN agencies supported the government through technical support, strengthening national institutions and mechanisms.

Turkish government has made significant efforts towards improving employment opportunities for refugees. Syrians who have completed a temporary protection period of six months can apply to all services delivered by the Public Employment Agency (ISKUR) of Turkey. If they meet the requirements in line with the relevant legislation, they can benefit from job and vocational counseling services, participate in vocational training courses, on-the-job and entrepreneurship training programs and take advantage of job placement services.

Despite the progress achieved so far, there are some difficulties for some refugees in accessing labor markets stemming from language barrier, a lack of information on the process to obtain a work permit, and reluctance or limited knowledge and capacity of some employers to go through the process and pay the cost of obtaining a work permit. Moreover, Turkey seeks continuous financial and technical support from the international community aiming to strengthen Turkish

---

<sup>9</sup> Paragraph states that “Voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity remains the preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations. The overriding priorities are to promote the enabling conditions for voluntary repatriation in full respect for the principle of non-refoulement, to ensure the exercise of a free and informed choice”

institutions' capacities to support refugees' labour market participation and expand their employment opportunities. This additional support would facilitate Turkey's response to quickly utilize high number of refugees' skills and qualifications through formal employment. There are currently more than 68,000 Syrians with work permits and approximately 100,000 Syrians with residence permits as of April, 2019.

The ILO has been active in supporting Turkey in finding decent work opportunities for these people since 2015. The ILO Turkey's Refugee Response Programme, mainly targets Syrians, but also includes some other groups. It adopted a five-year (2017-2021) comprehensive, holistic and integrated Programme of Support, promoting comprehensive short- and medium-term employment-rich measures to be implemented within the framework of Turkey's overall response and the 3RP. ILO's Refugee Response Programme consists of five projects that aims at building the skills of refugees, strengthening the labour market and business development environment through job creation and entrepreneurship opportunities for refugees and hosts and the reinforcement of governance systems and structures. The projects are implemented in the major Syrian refugee-hosting provinces and satellite cities accommodating non-Syrian refugees and migrants, in cooperation with tripartite constituents and UN agencies, and notably involving a direct partnership with IOM and UN Women. Key to ILO interventions is the fact that they always consider the demand and supply sides of the labour market – integrating skills development measures that are aligned with labour market needs so that better employment opportunities and decent jobs are facilitated. Further, throughout its activities in Turkey, the ILO adapts to local contexts and promotes gender equality and social cohesion between refugees and host communities.

*Source: 'Lessons Learned from ILO's Refugee Response Programme in Turkey: Supporting Livelihoods Opportunities for Refugees and Host Communities' (forthcoming)*

The Global Compact on Refugees, which was affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2018, translates the idea of responsibility-sharing for refugees and host communities' into concrete, practical measures. Key among these is the Global Refugee Forum, a mechanism which will bring together government leaders and a wide range of stakeholders from around the world to showcase and review progress against the objectives of the Compact and to pledge further action every four years. The first Forum will be held in Geneva 17-18 December 2019.

### 3. Recent trends in emigration and remittances

#### a. *A profile of diaspora in G20 countries by skill levels and countries of birth*

New OECD data (Box 6) show that almost 150 million foreign-born individuals aged 15 and older resided in G20 countries in 2015/16 (Table 4). The United States was the G20 country with the largest foreign-born population in 2015/16 (46 million or 31% of all immigrants in G20 countries). Estimates indicate that Germany (12 million), the Russian Federation (11.6 million) and Saudi Arabia (10.8 million) also hosted populations of more than 10 million foreign-born residents.

***A fifth of all foreign-born residents of G20 countries come from five countries.*** Mexico, with an emigrant population of 11.7 million, was the top country of birth for immigrants living in G20 countries in 2015/16. India (6.8 million), Bangladesh (4.9 million), Ukraine (4.8 million) and China (4.7 million) rounded out the top five countries of origin.

Immigrants from the main countries of origin tend to be concentrated in either OECD or non-OECD G20 countries. Nearly all of the immigrants from Mexico, Poland, Romania, Morocco and the Russian Federation lived in G20 countries in 2015/16. In contrast, most immigrants from Bangladesh, Ukraine, Pakistan and Kazakhstan resided in non-OECD countries.

#### **Box 6 The Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) and other data on immigrants in G20 countries**

The Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) covers OECD destination countries for which data were collected in 2000/01, 2005/06, 2010/11 and 2015/16. The uniqueness of this database, developed by the OECD since 2008, lies in the fact that it provides detailed information on the socio-economic profile of migrants by country of birth, which cannot be found in other data sources.

The main sources of the DIOC data are national administrative registers and population censuses. In the censuses conducted in 2000/01, almost all OECD countries collected information on the country of origin of emigrants, so that for the first time a detailed view of the number of immigrants was possible (for more general information on the DIOC database, see OECD (2008) and Arslan et al. (2015)). When censuses were not available or incomplete, they were replaced by labour force surveys. The 2015/16 version is, for the moment, preliminary because data collection from OECD countries is not yet complete.

The DIOC database contains information on populations aged 15 and over from more than 200 countries of origin residing in OECD countries of destination. The core variables are country of residence, country of birth, sex and level of education. Other variables – age, length of stay, labour force participation and occupation – can be cross-referenced with the core variables but not always with each other. Data on employment and occupation are generally available for the population over 15 years of age.

For this section, the DIOC 2015/16 database was used for OECD countries. For non-OECD G20 countries, the sources are: DIOC-E 2010/11 and 2015 UN Population Division International Migrant Stock estimate for Brazil and Indonesia; DIOC-E 2000/01 and 2015 UN Population Division International Migrant Stock estimate for Russia and India; 2015 UN Population Division International Migrant Stock estimate and Artuc et al. (2015) for Saudi Arabia. No data on immigrants by educational attainment is available for China, so this country is not included.

Source : OECD (2019 forthcoming)

***Almost 30% of the foreign-born population of G20 countries had a tertiary level of education in 2015/16,*** but this share varied across origin countries. Fairly low shares of immigrants from Mexico (10%), Bangladesh (10%), Morocco (17%) and Kazakhstan (19%) had tertiary education. In contrast, more than half of immigrants from India had a high level of education, and high shares of immigrants from the United Kingdom (49%), China (48%), the Russian Federation (43%) and Germany (42%) had tertiary education.

***The demographic profile of immigrants in G20 countries varies by origin and destination.*** Overall, half of the foreign born in 2015/16 were women, but this share varied among the top 15 origin countries from a low of 40% for Pakistan to a high of 60% for the Philippines. More than half of the top 15 countries had emigrant populations with majorities of women (Ukraine, China, Philippines, Poland, Kazakhstan, Germany, Romania and the Russian Federation). Almost 52% of immigrants in OECD countries were women, while this share was 43% for non-OECD countries. Only 11% of immigrants were between 15 and 24 years old, ranging from

only 5% of Italian immigrants to 17% of Chinese immigrants. A slightly higher share of immigrants in non-OECD countries (14%) were between 15 and 24 years old.

**Table 4. Top 15 countries of origin of immigrants aged 15 and over in G20 countries, 2015/16**

Country of birth	Number (thousands)	% in G20 non-OECD countries	Top G20 destination country	% highly educated	% women	% 15-24 years
Mexico	11 697	0.0	United States	9.7	48.0	9.6
India	6 695	30.4	United States	51.0	42.1	8.3
Bangladesh	4 885	86.1	India	10.4	42.1	8.8
China	4 641	3.6	United States	47.7	55.1	16.5
Ukraine	4 574	71.5	Russian Federation	29.3	55.7	10.0
Philippines	3 964	13.0	United States	48.9	59.6	9.2
Poland	3 797	1.1	Germany	30.4	54.1	7.4
Pakistan	3 695	62.4	Saudi Arabia	22.9	40.3	7.3
Kazakhstan	3 558	72.0	Russian Federation	18.5	53.8	16.1
United Kingdom	3 386	1.9	Australia	48.4	49.6	6.7
Romania	3 345	0.3	Italy	21.6	54.1	10.8
Germany	3 193	5.6	United States	41.0	55.0	10.2
Morocco	2 815	0.1	France	16.7	47.5	8.7
Turkey	2 395	0.5	Germany	13.0	48.2	4.8
Russian Federation	2 268	0.1	Germany	39.4	59.4	10.4
G20 Total	143 487	21.6	United States	28.8	51.5	10.3
G20 OECD Total	112 431	-	United States	32.1	51.8	10.3
G20 non-OECD Total	31 055	-	Russian Federation	16.6	49.8	12.0
Worldwide Total	223 226	49.6	-	-	48.4	11.2

*Note:* Foreign-born residents of G20 countries aged 15 and over. Highly educated refers to tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 11 levels 5-8). Data on age not available for Saudi Arabia. Data on education not available for Japan.

*Source:* OECD Box 6.


*b. Emigration rates to G20 countries by educational attainment for countries of origin of immigrants*

**Some countries may experience long-term or permanent emigration of their most educated nationals.** The most recent data, from this point of view, are not surprising: small developing countries, especially islands and landlocked countries, still have the highest rates of highly skilled emigration to G20 countries (Figure 9)<sup>10</sup>. Some countries in Central America and the Caribbean or Africa have a rate of emigration of tertiary graduates that exceeds 40% and nearly 30 countries have rates above 20% (excluding countries whose population 15 years and over is less than 500 000). For some of these countries, such as Guyana, Jamaica, Albania and El Salvador, total emigration rates are also very high; for others, such as Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the total emigration rate remains very low, reflecting a very strong selectivity of emigration, with only the most educated managing to emigrate to G20 countries.

On the other hand, highly populated countries, where the average level of education of the population has increased significantly in recent years, such as China or India, have very low tertiary-educated emigration rates (2% for China, 3.8% for India), even with large numbers of highly educated emigrants.

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted, however, that the available data, which relate to the countries of birth, do not make it possible to determine where the migrants attained their education: for some countries, a significant part of so-called high-skilled emigration is in fact due to pursuing higher education abroad.


**Figure 9. Total emigration rate and highly-educated emigration rate to G20 countries in the 25 countries where the highly educated emigration rate is the highest, 2015/16 (in %)**



Note: Excluding countries where the 15+ population is less than 500 000. Highly educated refers to tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 11 levels 5-8). Data on education not available for Japan. The emigration rate is calculated as the number of emigrants born in the country living in G20 countries divided by the sum of the resident population of the country plus its emigrants living in G20 countries.  
Source: OECD Box 6

Overall, as Figure 10 shows, with the exception of a few countries, the emigration rates of tertiary graduates are still higher than total emigration rates. This distinction is, however, much more pronounced for the poorest countries of origin, where emigration rates for people with low levels of education are typically very low. Having little human capital and often facing very strong liquidity constraints, these people have a low probability of getting a job in G20 countries and few opportunities to be able to finance a possible long-distance migration.


**Figure 10. Total and highly educated emigration rates by country of birth to G20 countries, 2015/16 (in %)**



Note: Foreign-born residents of G20 countries aged 15 and over. Highly educated refers to tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 11 levels 5-8). Data on education not available for Japan. The emigration rate is calculated as the number of emigrants born in the country living in G20 countries divided by the sum of the resident population of the country plus its emigrants living in G20 countries.  
Source: OECD Box 6, Lutz et al. (2014) for data on educational attainment in countries of origin.

*There is, however, a marked difference in the emigration rates of tertiary graduates by sex, particularly for those from non-G20 countries.* As shown in Figure 11, once the level of education is taken into account, the emigration rate of men and women born in G20 countries is not very different: for people with a low level of education the average emigration rate of men is 5.5% and that of women is 5.9%; for tertiary graduates, men and women have an almost identical emigration rate of 8.7%. Conversely, for non-G20 countries of birth, while there is little difference between men and women for those with a low or intermediate level of education, the difference is strong among tertiary graduates: The emigration rate for women is 20.4% while that for men is 16.4%.

**Figure 11. Emigration rate by level of education, country of birth and sex, 2015/16 (in %)**




Note: Foreign-born residents of G20 countries aged 15 and over. Highly educated refers to tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 11 levels 5-8). Data on education not available for Japan. The emigration rate is calculated as the number of emigrants born in the country living in G20 countries divided by the sum of the resident population of the country plus its emigrants living in G20 countries.  
 Source: OECD Box 6. Lutz et al. (2014) for data on educational attainment in countries of origin.

*Recent trends in remittances, diaspora engagement and development impact*

Given the development contributions of remittances the international community has over the last decade set key objectives and targets to be achieved in the context of the G20, and the UN SDGs set out very concrete provisions in relation to transfer costs, financial inclusion, competition, and investment.

*As compared to other financial flows, remittance volumes to developing countries are large and have risen steadily over the last 3 decades from USD 126 billion (1990) to USD 528 billion (2018)* (Figure 12). In 2018, remittance flows rose in all regions, most notably in Europe and Central Asia (20 percent) and South Asia (13.5 percent). These remittance flows are over 3 times the size of ODA flows and higher than FDI flows (excluding China), thereby forming an important source of development finance. For example, in Africa, remittances have been the largest and most stable source of international financial flows since 2010. Remittances are therefore significant contributors to GDP, form a valuable source of foreign exchange for governments and play a role in stabilizing the external sector. Globally the top 5 remittance receiving countries are India, China, Philippines, Mexico, Pakistan and the top 5 Remittance source countries are the United States, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, China and Russia.

**Figure 12 Financial flows to low and middle income countries**



Source : World Bank (2018)

In times of crisis remittances flows have been demonstrated to be more stable than private debt and portfolio equity flows. They play a crucial role in survival and poverty alleviation enabling the recipient to cope with protracted displacement and benefiting their families and communities in crisis zones. Data on remittances sent and received by refugees and IDPs however tends to be thin or country specific.

**Remittance transfer costs continue to remain above the SDG target of 3% globally** and in several corridors specifically. The global average cost of sending \$200 remains high at 6.9 percent in the third quarter of 2018. High remittance transfer costs cut into availability of funds at an individual level and development finance at a national level.

Two key contributing factors to the reduction of high remittance transfer costs are competition and technological developments. Globally, the number of remittance services providers has grown dramatically to over 3 000 worldwide. Further there has been a shift away from banks towards the usage of less costly MTOs for remittance transfers. Technological advances have contributed to competition, lowering remittance transfer costs and greater financial inclusion for recipients, by making transactions faster, cheaper and more convenient (Box 7). Mobile driven financial inclusion developments in Sub-Saharan Africa has been inspiring, jumping from 23% in 2011 to 43% in 2017. A greater range of remittance transfer mechanisms have emerged due to variations in technologies (bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, digital wallet) and platforms (banks, online transfers, digital wallet, mobile phones). A degree of caution is however warranted in the context of potential impacts on the financial system.

**Box 7. ‘Saver Asia’ helps migrant workers save when sending money home**

This App developed in the framework of the TRIANGLE Project, implemented by the ILO and extending the successful partnerships with the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Global Affairs Canada, building on years of working together to enhance labour migration governance in the ASEAN region. The app provides services from financial literacy to advice on how to open a basic bank account through digital tools. It also provides comparison on remitting costs to help migrants make better informed decision about their remittances.

Source: SaverAsia, available at: <https://www.saverasia.com/saveMoney>



**A large proportion of remittances are sent informally.** While exact figures are difficult to obtain, it is estimated that informal remittances are likely to amount to 35-75 % of official remittances to developing countries with significant regional variations. Similar observations have been made in more recent IOM reports which estimate that for the African Caribbean Pacific region informal remittances are at least as high as formal remittances and in some cases as high as 70 per cent. In South and East Asia too it was estimated that a large proportion of remittances are still sent informally to, and within, the region. In crisis and displacement situations, informal remittances are particularly marked as the mainstream financial system may not be functional. Further, displaced migrants may lack ID documents making it difficult or expensive to access formal remittance channels.

The use of the postal network in the context of remittance transfers is particularly relevant for financial inclusion, rural outreach and potentially crisis and displacement situations. The postal network constitutes the largest physical distribution network in the world with an estimated 670 000 postal establishments globally. A recent pilot project between IOM, the Universal Postal Union and Burundi Post indicated that the postal services have a ready infrastructure with a large rural reach and can contribute to rural outreach to migrant families, as well as financial literacy and financial inclusion. However, appropriate upscaling in terms of infrastructure and products needs to be invested in. Further anti-competitive arrangements such as

exclusive partnerships between the national post office systems and a single money transfer operator should be avoided.

At the individual and community levels, remittance flows for migrant families can be economic lifelines, in terms of poverty reduction, improving health and nutrition conditions, increasing education opportunities for children, improving housing and sanitation, promoting entrepreneurship and reducing inequality, thereby contributing to several linked UN SDGs. Further, formal remittances can result in greater financial inclusion, especially given that globally there are 1.7 billion unbanked adults. Financial inclusion brings migrants and their families into the mainstream financial system and enables access to useful and affordable financial services and products. Coupling remittances transfer with financial literacy can play an important role in financial inclusion. This in turn bolsters the financial systems in countries of origin and residence. Financial inclusion in displacement situations become particularly relevant both for the displaced migrant as well as their families in a crisis zone to whom they may wish to remit money.

### *c. Diaspora engagement*

***Diasporas are important agents of change engaging with countries of origin and destination*** in several ways, ranging from remittances, labour market participation, business, investment, trade and philanthropy to skills transfer and crisis-based interventions. Diaspora engagement particularly in time of crisis and displacement can create fruitful linkages with refugees in terms of mentoring, financing, skills contributions.

Beyond sending money back home diaspora also engage with their countries of origin through ‘social remittances’ –the flow of skills, knowledge, ideas and values migrants transmit home. Highly skilled diaspora can be an important source of research and innovation, technology transfer, and skills development. Low skilled migrants also engage economically and in terms of knowledge or skills they have acquired to the societies they live in and those that they originate from.

Diasporas also engage with countries of origin and destination through *entrepreneurship, trade and Investment*, thereby building assets and creating international trade and investment relationships. In terms of investment and trade, diasporas engage by building links between countries of origin and destination. They are less risk averse and contribute by way of big and small investment, market intelligence, technology. It is estimated around 10 % of diaspora invest back home (either in business ventures or as direct entrepreneurs). Diasporas are also consumers of home country goods. Studies undertaken in the US show that another 90 per cent of migrants consume goods from their home countries.

Diasporas engage with their home countries through philanthropic activities and charitable contributions, especially during time of crisis, where remittances and migrant investment tend to increase, even though it is more difficult for them to engage effectively.

A structured approach is required for engaging diaspora based on IOM’s 3Es strategy for action: engage, enable and empower. *Engage diaspora* by knowing who and where they are as well as how they can contribute. A most effective way to achieve this is through diaspora mappings and the use of technology, social media and the internet to connect. *Enable transnational communities* so that they can serve as architects of economic and social progress. Finally, *empower diaspora to mobilize skills and expertise*. The inclusion of diaspora in the design and management of engagement initiatives creates ownership and long-term support.

Other mechanisms that can be used to engage diaspora further include better diaspora data including their needs and interests, dual or multiple citizenship, policies to create diaspora engagement such as UNDPs Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) and IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programmes which enabled diaspora skills engagement and social contributions in their home country health and education sectors as well as in post conflict countries.




#### 4. Demographic changes, digitalisation, migration and forced displacement

##### a. Recent and forthcoming demographic trends: possible implications for migration

**Globally, the population aged 65 or older is expected to outnumber young people by 2050.** Aging population is a reality in most of the world, notably in G20 countries, which are undergoing major demographic changes. United Nations estimates and projections show that the median age of the population in G20 countries has increased on average by almost 10 years between 1980 and 2015, and that project a further increase of at least seven years between 2015 and 2050 (Figure 13).

On the one hand, some G20 countries are expected to age faster in the next decades: this is for example the case of Brazil, with a projected median age increase of 14 years between 2015 and 2050, Mexico and Korea (+13 years each), Turkey (+12 years), China (+11 years), India and Saudi Arabia (+10 years each). On the other hand, in countries where the median age was already quite high in the 1980s, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and France, the increase will be more moderate. By 2050, it is expected that the median age will be at least 40 in 16 G20 countries, while this was the case in only seven countries in 2015.

**Figure 13 Median age of the population of G20 countries in 1980, 2015 and 2050 (projected)**




Source: UNDESA, World Population Prospects.

Although the population is also ageing in non-G20 countries, the process is occurring much more gradually (Figure 14). For the world as a whole, the median age of the population has increased from 23 to 30 between 1980 and 2015 and is expected to reach 36 by 2050. The working-age population will increase by about 1.2 billion in non-G20 countries but this growth will not be evenly distributed across countries. In fact, Africa alone will account for three-quarters of this increase. African countries will also account for 100% of the increase of the population aged 0-15 in non-G20 countries and Africa will remain the youngest region: the median age was 19 in 2015 and is projected to reach no more than 25 in 2050.

Population ageing in G20 countries is driven by both fertility rates decline and increasing longevity. In most cases, the latter component is predominant. As a result, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase in all G20 countries between 2015 and 2050 (Figure 15). This increase will be especially pronounced in Korea (+48 percentage points), Italy (+31 pp), China (+31 pp) and Japan (+29 pp).


**Figure 14 Population by age group in G20 countries, non-G20 countries and Africa, 2015-2050 (in millions)**



***This trend will be challenging for social systems in many G20 countries.*** A direct implication of the change in the age structure of the population is the increase in public expenditures on pensions, social security and healthcare, including services dedicated to the elderly population. In addition, rising dependency ratios stress repartition pension systems, which has led several G20 countries to put in place pension reforms such as increasing retirement age or mandatory contributions, reducing pensions, or implementing a combination of those options.

***In addition, ageing population has an impact on the size of the working age population*** (in relative and absolute terms) and consequently on the functioning of the labour market. In particular, labour shortages may emerge in specific regions, sectors or occupations, at different skill levels. The risk of shortages is especially acute in occupations where labour demand is bound to increase because of ageing itself, such as healthcare or domestic services. In higher-income countries, the growing demands for care work has been partially met through migration flows. Women from low-income countries have to leave their own children to internal or international migrant workers respectively, and go abroad to fill care-related jobs, a phenomenon known as ‘global care chains’ (ILO, 2016a).


**Figure 15 Old-age dependency ratio of G20 countries in 2015 and 2050 (projected)**



Note: The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the 65+ population to the working-age population (15-64).  
Source: UNDESA, World Population Prospects.

***Much depends on the skill levels of the young people entering into the future labour force.*** Expected changes in the size of the 25-34 population at different education levels, which result from projected demographic dynamics and future trends in educational attainment, are good indicators of potential changes in labour supply by skill level. By 2050, there will be fewer low-educated young people, and more highly educated young people in the G20. For the G20 as a whole, between 2015 and 2050, the 25-34 population with less than tertiary education is projected to decrease from 580 million to about 400 million, while the 25-34 population with tertiary education should increase from 150 million to 230 million. For some G20 countries, the 25-34 population with less than tertiary education will decrease strongly: this is for example the case for China (-60%), Korea and Japan (-50% each). On the other hand, the supply of skilled labour will increase in almost all G20 countries, except in Korea, Japan and Russia, where youth cohorts will continue to shrink (Figure 16).

**Figure 16 Projected change in the population aged 25-34 with tertiary education and less than tertiary education in G20 countries, 2015-2050 (in %)**



Note: Medium scenario (SSP2). “Population Component of Medium (SSP2): This is the middle of the road scenario that can also be seen as the most likely path for each country. It combines for all countries medium fertility with medium mortality, medium migration, and the Global Education Trend (GET) education scenario.”

Source: Lutz, Butz and KC (2014). *World Population and Human Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, IIASA.

Because the shape of future labour demand at different skill levels is difficult to forecast, it is still too early to draw implications from these changes in terms of potential shortages. However, even with labour-saving technologies, it will probably be challenging in a number of G20 countries to satisfy labour needs at intermediate skill levels.

#### *Possible implications for migration*

***Young people dominate international migrant flows – around 70 per cent are younger than 30.*** An estimated 70.9 million young people were unemployed globally in 2017, and 76.7 per cent of working youth were in informal jobs, compared with 57.9 per cent of working adults (ILO, 2017a). A growing number of young people actually wish to move permanently to another country. Whether these expectations will be realised or not depends on the potential for matching demand and supply across borders

***International migration, notably labour migration, is often seen as one way, in conjunction with other policies, to address such demographic imbalances.*** However, it cannot be the sole or even principal policy response for G20 countries with demographic deficits, not least because immigrants themselves are also ageing, and SDG development responses are seeking first and foremost to establish decent work opportunities in migrants' home countries. While indeed, no G20 country currently employs such a strategy, although some G20 countries consider demographic objectives in their overall migration framework, for example by setting target numbers for immigration as a percentage of the population. Other explicitly mention migration as one of their tools in the national demographic strategy.

***The link between demographic trends and migration is not straightforward,*** including because not all workers need to be replaced. What is more, migration is a complex phenomenon, shaped by a whole range of factors that include not only economic and demographic factors and resulting labour needs, but also migration policies and opportunities, and migrant characteristics, among other issues. As such, labour migration is only one component of international migration flows; in most G20 countries, only a minority of migrants are directly selected as migrant workers.

That notwithstanding, labour migration can be part of the tool box to respond to some ageing-related labour shortages, notably to respond to specific labour demand in some sectors or occupations in those G20 countries where local labour supply is insufficient, where appropriate management strategies are put in place and meet international labour standards.

For labour migration to have positive development outcomes for aging societies and migrant workers themselves, a number of prerequisites should be part of management strategies. The first is that those immigrants and their children who are already in G20 countries are well integrated into the host societies and labour markets. This is crucial not least for the acceptance of further immigration. The second, and closely related, is that the domestic labour supply – which includes resident immigrants and their native-born children, whose employment rates often lag behind those of other groups – is fully used, and evidence-based such as through labour market needs assessments and social dialogue. The third is that the objectives of labour migration policies are well set, and migration managed accordingly. A fourth prerequisite is that skills that are in oversupply in countries of origin be matched with skills needed at destination. This will require reinforcing the links between labour migration management and skills development tools.

In this context the 2018 OECD-ILO-IOM-UNHCR G20 Annual International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report referred to Skills Mobility Partnerships (SMPs) as an innovative approach to sharing the costs of training between all parties involved, including employers, as well as to improving the global pool of skills and matching mechanisms. Such partnerships can be organised in different ways, and do not necessarily cover only high-skilled migrant workers (OECD 2018b). The ILO, the IOM, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Employers Organization (IOE), and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) have joined forces to launch a Global Skills Partnership on Migration<sup>11</sup>. The Partnership will pool expertise to build platforms to assist nationals and migrant workers as appropriate, including those who return, to develop and recognize their skills. It will have a particular focus on low- and medium-skilled migrant workers, women and youth.

#### *b. Digitalisation, new forms of work and implications for migration and forced displacement*

***New technologies such as robotics and artificial intelligence are rapidly changing people's jobs and lives.*** They have the potential to free up workers to do more productive, less routine tasks and to provide consumers with access to more and better products and services. However, technology will likely change many of the existing jobs, requiring workers and companies to adjust. Recent OECD estimates suggests that 14% of all jobs across the 32 OECD countries analysed have a high risk of automation. A further 32% of jobs may experience significant changes to how they are carried out (OECD 2018c).

---

<sup>11</sup> See: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_emp/---ifp\\_skills/documents/publication/wcms\\_653993.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---ifp_skills/documents/publication/wcms_653993.pdf)

***During the past decade, one of the most salient transformations in the world of work has also been the emergence of digital labour platforms.*** They include web-based platforms, where work is outsourced through an open call to a geographically dispersed crowd (known as ‘crowdwork’), and location-based applications (‘apps’), which allocate work to individuals in specific geographical areas (Berg et al 2018). Up until now, much of the debate on the ‘microtask platforms’ has been centred on the classification of workers as self-employed and how this has affected their protections and social security rights.

Little is known, however, about the effects of the transformations around the ‘future of work’ on labour migration. Three interrelated channels can be identified: first, the adaptation of labour market needs and institutions, second, the use of new technologies in labour migration to improve matching and protect the rights of migrant workers and third, the emergence of new forms of ‘digital labour migration’ with potential implications in the movement of workers, however, further research is needed

#### *Possible implications of digitalisation for migration*

***Automation will impact labour migration.*** While there is some evidence that automation is pushing native-born workers to move into more complex and communicative roles, migrants, who in many cases have an imperfect mastery of the host country language, culture and norms and have more limited labour market related networks, may be at a disadvantage. This may be particularly true for those with a lower educational attainment who are concentrated in more routine jobs. Recent OECD study has indeed shown that, in Europe, more than 40% of foreign-born workers are in occupations dominated by routine tasks (OECD 2017).

If this automation may, in the long-run, lead to a declining demand for low skilled foreign workers, in the short and medium term, the opposite effect could be observed. Indeed, as occupations most at risk of being automatized appear less and less attractive to new labour market entrants, recruitment difficulties may increase even with declining overall employment. As a result, international recruitments may increase at least temporarily. This paradoxical trend has been observed over the past decades in the context of deindustrialisation of several OECD countries. Many of the migrants in these sectors actually stayed and now need support to retrain and adjust to changing structural labour market needs. ***New forms of ‘digital labour migration’ are also being created through the outsourcing of tasks and work across national borders.*** Much new and future work will be performed online and can be carried out from anywhere in the world. One example is an IT platform, through which IT specialists, from different countries offer their services. Depending on whether there is capacity or scarcity on the global labour market, this can have a major impact on the price at which these services are offered. A serious challenge is to decide how to address and measure all forms of labour migration, and whether this ‘digital labour migration’ should be included, to assess potential unfair competition and social dumping (ILO 2017b).

In relation to skills, permanent or temporary labour migration arrangements might be adapted, if issues related to migrant workers’ rights are effectively covered, to address these new demands. The ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (ILO, 2006) contains guidance and good practices that can help ensure that “temporary work schemes respond to established labour market needs, and that these schemes respect the principle of equal treatment between migrant and national workers” (Principle IV – Effective Management of Labour Migration, Guideline 5.5).

***Digitalisation is also impacting the protection of migrant workers through the use of digital migration management platforms, and the development of apps as awareness raising and tools to facilitate remittances transfers.*** Digital migration management platforms can help reduce recruitment cost and time, associated with administrative procedures, which too often pushes many women and men to migrate through informal, undocumented, and unsafe channels (see Box 8). In addition, when digital management platforms store important documents – such as work contracts, payment slips or medical certificates – they create a record of agreements, a so called ‘digital trail’. This can be useful if disputes about contract terms, repayments or other issues arise between a migrant worker and an employer or recruitment agency.

Other good emerging practices include the use of digital solutions for managing support services to migrant workers throughout the migration cycle, including legal support, welfare assistance and online training opportunities (Engblom, 2018). With the support of the ILO, in 2018, the ASEAN countries launched the

‘ASEAN Recommendations on the use of digital technologies for a fair labour migration (ILO 2018b)’, which present 15 recommendations to promote the use of digital tools. For example, they promote the use of smart devices in training or job matching of migrant workers, including: pre-departure and post-arrival information programmes; dissemination of information; and skills upgrading and certification.

#### Box 8 Recruitment Advisor

The Recruitment Advisor is a web platform developed by ITUC with support of the ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative. It lists government-licensed recruitment agencies in Nepal, the Philippines, Indonesia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and other countries monitored by a network of trade unions and civil society organisations. These organisations reach out to workers to learn about their rights and review recruitment agencies performance. In turn, by following the ILO General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment, the Recruitment Advisor platform provides feedback to governments regarding the practices of licenced agencies. This is an example of tapping into technological developments to enhance the monitoring system of private and public recruitment agencies.

Source: ITUC and ILO [Fair Recruitment Initiative](#)



***New technologies have been affecting immigration management and enforcement notably through biometric applications.*** The responsible use of biometrics, in full respect of applicable privacy and personal data protection laws and regulations, can be an effective tool to enhance migration management and empower refugees and migrants. Nevertheless, biometric data are often categorized as being highly sensitive, mainly due to their unique nature and the increased difficulties relating to their alteration or duplication. As with all new technologies, the advantages and disadvantages, and benefits and risks, need to be carefully assessed.

Biometrics is a valuable tool for identity and migration management processes and the use of biometrics covers a broad array of migration-related activities and use cases, ranging from the development of biometric applications made available to States for enhanced border management and identity validation, via the processing of migrants’ biometric data for facilitated regular migration, to the use of biometrics in displacement and crisis situations to support identity management in humanitarian work and facilitate the delivery of life-saving assistance to rightful beneficiaries.

The use of automated biometric recognition of individuals based on physical and behavioural characteristics improves the reliability and accuracy of verification processes, which ensure that the biographical identity matches the biometric identity of an individual. Reliable identification and verification is vital for protecting identities and preventing identity or entitlement fraud. Delivering efficient and swift protection or assistance to beneficiaries often relies on the ability to verify eligible individuals and to prevent irregularities regarding identity claims.

Collecting biometric data in registration processes can help to identify vulnerable individuals who may require additional assistance, including pregnant women, persons with physical disabilities and unaccompanied children. Reliable data on vulnerabilities and persons with specific needs enable relief agencies to provide more targeted and individualized assistance, to make related processes more efficient and to streamline programming and planning activities.

IOM and UNHCR work closely with various partners, including governments and intergovernmental organizations, in the field of identity management for development and humanitarian response (Boxes 9 & 10). Moreover, current and emerging expertise – and the innovations and potential of the private market – are of fundamental importance to the use of biometrics with regard to the provision of assistance and protection as well as identity, migration and border management systems. It is important to identify areas for effective cooperation with the private sector and other partners, ensure access to the latest technologies and best practices, and embrace transparent and responsible cooperation models.

### **Box 9 Promoting the responsible use of biometrics for migration management**

In 2016, IOM carried out a comprehensive assessment of its global work related to biometrics. The assessment covered a broad range of thematic areas of IOM activities and highlighted the fact that IOM has become a considerable global player in the field of biometrics for identity management. Over four years, IOM Missions in 80 countries had implemented 125 projects with significant biometric components.

Building on the experience gained and expertise generated by current biometric projects, IOM aims at further strengthening its capacity to apply biometric tools in an effective and responsible manner in identity and migration management projects. The swift and accurate identification of individuals ensures that such programmes are coherent and client-focused. Biometrics are used for identity and migration management, to facilitate and expedite regular and safe cross-border mobility and migration, the registration of internally displaced persons, returnees and vulnerable migrants, the management and distribution of humanitarian assistance and integration grants, assisting governments to carry out identity verification when issuing passports, visas and other travel documents; and the verification of traveller identity by government border authorities.

In this work, the IOM promotes the responsible use of biometrics, effective personal data protection and respect of privacy. The IOM underlines the importance of using biometrics responsibly and, notably, of ensuring the protection of personal data of beneficiaries and respect for the rule of law. When processing biometric data, therefore, IOM ensures that the data are collected in a lawful and fair manner with the consent of beneficiaries, and that the purpose of the processing is specified and legitimate. It is important that the biometric data obtained be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the specified purpose. In this context, data security is also of great importance. It is important to ensure that biometric data are kept secure, both technically and organizationally. In particular, one must ensure that the data are protected by reasonable and appropriate measures against unauthorized modification, tampering, unlawful destruction, accidental loss, improper disclosure and undue transfer.

### **Box 10 Biometrics and refugee protection**

UNHCR's biometric systems have significantly improved over the past few years and the use of biometrics across UNHCR operations has been rapidly expanded to facilitate identity management processes and improve operational efficiencies in the delivery of protection, assistance and durable solutions. Depending on the context, UNHCR collects biometric data sets consisting of fingerprints and irises. At the end of 2018, biometrics were used in 60 UNHCR country operations and UNHCR aims at using biometrics in 75 operations by 2020 as per its Grand Bargain commitment. UNHCR's corporate biometric tool is the Biometric Identity Management System (BIMS), used in 55 countries. Another system, IrisGuard, is used in five countries in the Middle East in response to the Syria crisis. With some 7.2 million individuals biometrically enrolled at the end of 2018, eight in every ten refugees registered by UNHCR now has a biometric identity. Wide coverage of biometrics across UNHCR operations strengthens the credibility of UNHCR's population statistics and data integrity, facilitating programming and planning activities.

The use of biometrics protects refugees' identities, minimising risks of impersonation and multiple registration. Simultaneously, anchoring an individual's biometrics to his/her biographic identity facilitates the establishment of a legal identity for many individuals who may never have had a legal identity before and enables them to partake in the socio-political life of the host country they reside in. During registration, biometrics identify whether an individual has been previously registered. Biometrics are also used to verify the identity of persons of concern prior to the issuance of documentation to ensure that documents are provided to the rightful individual while enhancing host State's trust in UNHCR's identity management processes. Similarly, biometrics are used to verify identities at assistance provision to ensure assistance reaches the rightful beneficiaries and to record and track the delivery, significantly improving the integrity of the distribution processes, increasing efficiencies and speeding up processing times. UNHCR's corporate tool for assistance distribution is the Global Distribution Tool (GDT), which monitors and manages distribution of goods to persons of concern, using biometrics collected in BIMS. The GDT was in use in seven UNHCR country operations by the end of 2018, with increased roll-outs to come during 2019.

The use of biometrics within UNHCR is governed by the organisation's Data Protection Policy<sup>12</sup> that specifies the data subject's rights and outlines the mandatory principles of data processing for UNHCR and its implementing partners and the requirements regarding the transfer of data to third parties.

UNHCR works with IOM and with resettlement States to verify biometrics prior to resettlement interviews, medical checks and departures, after refugees have provided specific and explicit consent for this use as parts of their resettlement application. This substantially strengthens the integrity of the resettlement process while increasing efficiency, timeliness, automation and data protection.

<sup>12</sup> [UNHCR's Policy on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR](#) (May 2015)

## Conclusion

Migration and forced displacement remain priority areas for many G20 countries and beyond. In total there are about 258 million people living outside their country of birth globally, with two-thirds living in G20 countries. An unprecedented 68.5 million people around the world have been forced from home. Among them are 25.4 million refugees, of which there are just under 20 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate. In the meantime, G20 countries receive more than 13 million permanent and temporary migrants every year from both other G20 countries and from the rest of the world..

During the past decade, migration policies have undergone significant structural adjustment - both at national, regional and global levels - often aiming at adopting more efficient control mechanisms and integration policies. Going forward, G20 countries will have to face shared structural changes linked to digitalisation and the future of work, population ageing and demographic imbalances, climate change and forced displacement, etc., which will all affect their migration and integration systems.

The 2019 edition of *International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report to the G20* has reviewed some of these challenges and identified a number of policy trade-offs that will need to be addressed to maintain well managed migration systems and make the most of migration, aiming at achieving the SDG commitment of leaving no one behind. The responses will vary from country to country but identifying common challenges and opportunities, exchanging on best practices, joining forces to improve the availability and quality of international data and evidence on migration and forced displacement will be key and the G20 has a central role to play in this global endeavour.



# References

- ADBI-ILO-OECD (2018) *Increasing the Development Impact of Migration through Finance and Technology* <http://www.oecd.org/migration/labor-migration-in-asia-increasing-the-development-impact-of-migration-through-finance-and-technology-9789264289642-en.htm>
- ADBI-ILO-OECD (2019) *Building Partnerships for Effectively Managing Labor. Lessons from Asian countries*
- Arslan, C. et al. (2015), “A New Profile of Migrants in the Aftermath of the Recent Economic Crisis”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 160, Éditions OCDE, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxt2t3nnjr5-en>
- Artuc, E. et al. (2015), “A Global Assessment of Human Capital Mobility: The Role of Non-OECD Destinations”, *World Development*, Vol. 65, pp. 6-26, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2014.04.004>
- Berg, J., M. Furrer, E. Harmon, U. Rani, and M. Six Silberman (2018) *Digital Labour Platforms and the future of work: Towards decent work in the online world*, Geneva: ILO. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS\\_645337/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_645337/lang--en/index.htm)
- Centre for Entrepreneurs (2018). *Starting Afresh. How entrepreneurship is transforming the lives of resettled refugees* <https://centreforentrepreneurs.org/cfe-research/starting-afresh-how-entrepreneurship-is-transforming-the-lives-of-resettled-refugees/>
- Copley C. (2016) Refugees bring entrepreneurial spirit to risk-shy Germany, February 2016 <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-entrepreneurs/refugees-bring-entrepreneurial-spirit-to-risk-shy-germany-idUKKCN0VA2D8>
- Engblom, A. (2018). OP-ED. *How digitalization can help achieve fair migration*. Available at [https://www.ilo.org/asia/media-centre/news/WCMS\\_648541/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/asia/media-centre/news/WCMS_648541/lang--en/index.htm)
- Ernst E., R. Merola, and D. Samaan (2018) The economics of artificial intelligence: Implications for the future of work, ILO Future of Work Research Paper Series, Geneva: ILO. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/publication/wcms\\_647306.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/publication/wcms_647306.pdf)
- G20 (2017a) G20 Leaders’ Declaration *Shaping an interconnected world* <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Anlagen/2017/07/2017-07-08-abschlusserklaerung-g20-eng.html>
- G20 (2017b), *Towards an Inclusive Future: Shaping the World of Work, Annex C: G20 Policy Practices for the Fair and Effective Labour Market Integration of Regular Migrants and Recognised Refugees*, [http://www.w20-germany.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/documents/Arbeitsministererklaerung\\_und\\_Annex.pdf](http://www.w20-germany.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Arbeitsministererklaerung_und_Annex.pdf)
- G20 (2018) G20 Leaders' Declaration: Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development [https://g20.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/buenos\\_aires\\_g20\\_leaders\\_declaration.pdf](https://g20.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/buenos_aires_g20_leaders_declaration.pdf)
- IDMC (2018) GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 2018 <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report>
- ILO-UNHCR (2017) A GUIDE TO MARKET-BASED LIVELIHOOD INTERVENTIONS FOR REFUGEES <https://www.unhcr.org/594b7d7f7.pdf>
- International Labour Organization (2006) *Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration; Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach* (Geneva), International Labour Office. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms\\_178672.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_178672.pdf)
- International Labour Organization (2016a) *The future of labour supply: Demographics, migration, unpaid work* (Geneva). Briefing note the Future of Work Centenary Initiative Issue Note Series No.2. Available at:

[https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms\\_534204.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_534204.pdf)

International Labour Organization (2016b) *World employment and social outlook: Trends for youth 2016* (Geneva).

International Labour Organization (2017c) *Labour migration, skills development and the future of work in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries*, Working Paper, December 2017. Available at:

[https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-new-delhi/documents/publication/wcms\\_634982.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-new-delhi/documents/publication/wcms_634982.pdf)

International Labour Organization (2018a). ILO global estimates on international migrant workers: Results and methodology [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_652001.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_652001.pdf)

International Labour Organization (2018b) Recommendations of the 11<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labor, 31 October 2018, available at: [https://www.ilo.org/asia/events/WCMS\\_648531/lang-en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/asia/events/WCMS_648531/lang-en/index.htm)

International Labour Organization, (2017a) *Global Employment Trends for Youth 2017: Paths to a better working future* (Geneva). Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms\\_598669.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_598669.pdf)

International Labour Organization, (2017b). *Synthesis Report of the National Dialogues on the Future of Work*, 21 September 2017, Geneva. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/publication/wcms\\_591505.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/publication/wcms_591505.pdf)

IOM (2018) Global Migration Indicators:

[http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global\\_migration\\_indicators\\_2018.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_migration_indicators_2018.pdf)

IOM (2018) Making Mobility Work for Adaptation to Environmental Changes: Results from the MECLEP Global Research: [http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/meclep\\_comparative\\_report.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/meclep_comparative_report.pdf)

IOM (2018) Migration in the 2030 Agenda: A guide for practitioners:

[http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/sdg\\_en.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/sdg_en.pdf)

IOM (2018) World Migration Report 2018: [http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2018\\_en.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf)

IOM (2017) Migration Research Leaders' Syndicate: Ideas to inform international cooperation on safe, orderly and regular migration:

[http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration\\_research\\_leaders\\_syndicate.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_research_leaders_syndicate.pdf)

Ionesco, D., D. Mokhnacheva and F. Gemenne (2017). *The Atlas of Environmental Migration*. Routledge, London. Available from <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/atlas-environmental-migration>

Jock Collins. Refugee Entrepreneurship in Australia <https://www.uts.edu.au/research-and-teaching/our-research/future-work-and-industry/our-research/refugee-entrepreneurship>

Lutz, W., W. Butz and S. KC (eds.) (2014), *World Population and Human Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford University Press, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198703167.001.0001>

Nadeem S. Report highlights increase in entrepreneurship among Syrian refugees in B.C., May 2, 2018

OAS-OECD (2017) *International Migration in the Americas -SICREMI*,

<http://www.oecd.org/migration/sicremi.htm>

OECD (2008), *A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century: Data from OECD Countries*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264040915-en>

OECD (2017) *International Migration Outlook 2017* [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2017\\_migr\\_outlook-2017-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2017_migr_outlook-2017-en)

OECD (2018a) *International Migration Outlook 1999-2018* <http://www.oecd.org/migration/international-migration-outlook-1999124x.htm>

OECD (2018b), *What would make Global Skills Partnerships work in practice?*, Migration Policy Debates n°15 <https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debate-15.pdf>

OECD (2018c) OECD Policy Brief: Putting a face behind the jobs at risk of automation

OECD (2019 forthcoming) A global profile of the diaspora based on new DIOC data for 2015/16

OECD/EU (2016) How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe? A first evaluation based on the 2014 EU Labour Force Survey ad hoc module Working Paper 1/2016  
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=16130&langId=en>

OECD/EU (2018) Settling in 2018. Indicators of immigrant integration  
<https://www.oecd.org/publications/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-2018-9789264307216-en.htm>

OECD-ILO-IOM-UNHCR (2018), *G20 global displacement and migration trends and policies report 2018* <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/G20-international-migration-and-displacement-trends-report-2018.pdf>

OECD-UNHCR (2018) SAFE PATHWAYS FOR REFUGEES OECD-UNHCR Study on third country solutions for refugees: family reunification, study programmes and labour mobility  
<https://www.oecd.org/migration/UNHCR-OECD-safe-pathways-for-refugees.pdf>

Ormiston J. (2017) Refugees are helping others in their situation as social entrepreneurs, July 13, 2017  
<https://theconversation.com/refugees-are-helping-others-in-their-situation-as-social-entrepreneurs-80475>

Rigaud K.K., A. de Sherbinin, B. Jones, J. Bergmann, V. Clement, K. Ober, J. Schewe, S. Adamo, B. McCusker, S. Heuser, and A. Midgley. 2018. Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. Washington, DC: The World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461>

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018). *Special Report - Global Warming of 1.5 °C*. Available from <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>.

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work (Art. 6 of the Covenant)*, 6 February 2006, E/C.12/GC/18,  
[https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fGC%2f18&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fGC%2f18&Lang=en)

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)*, 7 April 2016, E/C.12/GC/23,  
[https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fGC%2f23&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fGC%2f23&Lang=en)

UNCTAD, UNHCR, IOM (2018) Policy Guide on Entrepreneurship for Migrants and Refugees  
[https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diae2018d2\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diae2018d2_en.pdf)

UNHCR (2018) Turn The Tide: Refugee Education in Crisis <https://www.unhcr.org/5b852f8e4.pdf>

UNHCR (2019) Global Compact on Refugees  
<https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5b3295167/official-version-final-draft-global-compact-refugees.html>

UNHCR (2019) Projected Global Resettlement Needs  
<https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/5b28a7df4/projected-global-resettlement-needs-2019.html>

World Bank (2018) Migration and development Brief n°30 <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-30>